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CANDIDES AND CASSANDRAS: TECHNOLOGY 
AND FREE SPEECH ON THE ROBERTS COURT 
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT* 
ABSTRACT 
John Roberts assumed his position as Chief Justice of the United States 
just prior to the commencement of the October 2005 Term of the Supreme 
Court. That was seven years after Google was incorporated, one year 
before Facebook became available to the general public, and two years 
before Apple released the first iPhone. The twelve years of the Roberts 
Court have thus been a period of constant and radical technological 
innovation and change, particularly in the areas of mass communication 
and the media. It is therefore somewhat astonishing how few of the Roberts 
Court’s free speech decisions touch upon new technology and technological 
change. Indeed, it can be argued that only two cases directly address new 
technology: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association on video 
games, and Packingham v. North Carolina on social media. Packingham, it 
should be noted, is the only Roberts Court free speech case directly 
implicating the Internet. Even if one extends the definition of cases 
addressing technology (as I do), only four cases, at most, can be said to 
address technology and free speech. 
It seems inevitable that going forward, this is going to change. In 
particular, recent calls to regulate “fake news” and otherwise impose 
filtering obligations on search engines and social media companies will 
inevitably raise important and difficult First Amendment issues. Therefore, 
this is a good time to consider how the Roberts Court has to date reacted to 
technology and what that portends for the future. This paper examines the 
Roberts Court’s free speech/technology jurisprudence (as well as touching 
upon a few earlier cases), with a view to doing just that. The pattern that 
emerges is a fundamental dichotomy: some Justices are inclined to be 
Candides, and others to be Cassandras. Candide is the main character of 
Voltaire’s satire Candide, ou l’Optimisme, famous for repeating his 
teacher, Professor Pangloss’s mantra “all is for the best” in the “best of all 
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possible worlds.” Cassandra was the daughter of King Priam and Queen 
Hecuba of Troy in Greek mythology, condemned by the god Apollo to 
accurately prophesize disaster, but never to be believed. While not all 
justices fit firmly within one or the other camp, the Roberts Court is clearly 
divided relatively evenly between technology optimists and technology 
pessimists. 
The paper begins by analyzing the key technology/free speech decisions 
of the Roberts Court, and classifying the current Justices as Candides or 
Cassandras based on their opinions or votes in those cases. In the 
remainder of the paper, I offer some thoughts on two obvious questions. 
First, why is the Court divided between Candides and Cassandras and what 
qualities explain the divergence (spoiler: it is not simply partisan or 
political preferences). And second, what does this division portend for the 
future. As we shall see, my views on the first issue are consistent with, and 
indeed closely tied to, Greg Magarian’s analysis of Managed Speech on the 
Roberts Court. On the second question, I am modestly (but only modestly) 
optimistic that the Candides will prevail and that the Court will not respond 
with fear to new technology. I am, in other words, hopeful that the Court 
will fend off heavy handed efforts to assert state control over the Internet 
and social media, despite the obvious threats and concerns associated with 
that technology. I close by considering some possible regulatory scenarios 
and how the Court might respond to them. 
INTRODUCTION 
John Roberts assumed his position as Chief Justice of the United States 
just prior to the commencement of the October 2005 Term of the Supreme 
Court.1 That was seven years after Google was incorporated,2 one year 
before Facebook became available to the general public,3 and two years 
before Apple released the first iPhone.4 The twelve years of the Roberts 
Court have thus been a period of constant and radical technological 
innovation and change, particularly in the areas of mass communication and 
the media. It is therefore somewhat astonishing how few of the Roberts 
Court’s free speech decisions touch upon new technology and technological 
change. Indeed, it can be argued that only two cases directly address new 
technology: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association on video 
                                                 
1. Roberts Sworn in as Chief Justice CNN (Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/ 
POLITICS/09/29/roberts.nomination/index.html.  
2. GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/our-story/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).  
3. FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).  
4. APPLE, https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2007/01/09Apple-Reinvents-the-Phone-with-












games,5 and Packingham v. North Carolina on social media.6 Packingham, 
it should be noted, is the only Roberts Court free speech case directly 
addressing issues specific to the Internet. Even if one expands the definition 
of cases addressing technology (as I do in this paper), only four cases, at 
most, can be said to address technology and free speech directly. 
It seems inevitable that going forward, this is going to change. In 
particular, recent calls to regulate “fake news” and otherwise impose 
filtering obligations on search engine and social media companies will 
inevitably raise important and difficult First Amendment issues.7 This is 
therefore a good time to consider how the Roberts Court has reacted to 
technology to date, and what that portends for the future. This paper 
examines the Roberts Court’s free speech/technology jurisprudence with a 
view to doing just that. The pattern that emerges, though admittedly 
somewhat fuzzy, is a dichotomy: some Justices are inclined to be Candides, 
and others to be Cassandras. Candide is the main character of Voltaire’s 
satire Candide, ou l’Optimisme, famous for repeating his teacher, Professor 
Pangloss’s mantra “all is for the best” in the “best of all possible worlds.”8 
Cassandra was the daughter of King Priam and Queen Hecuba of Troy in 
Greek mythology, condemned by the god Apollo to accurately prophesize 
disaster, but never to be believed.9 While not all justices fit firmly within 
one or the other camp, the Roberts Court seems divided relatively evenly 
between technology optimists and technology pessimists. 
Part I of this paper begins by summarizing and analyzing the Roberts 
Court’s major free speech/technology cases (and tangentially touches on a 
few earlier decisions). In Part II, I consider how and why the Justices of the 
Roberts Court are divided between Candides and Cassandras, including 
what qualities might explain the divergence (spoiler: it is not only partisan 
or political leanings). And finally, in Part III I will offer some thoughts on 
what these divisions portend for the future. 
 
                                                 
5. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
6. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
7. See generally Online Platforms and Free Speech: Regulating Fake News, 127 YALE L. J. 
(Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/collection/regulating-fake-news.  
8. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE, OU L’OPTIMISME 6 (1759). Technically, this paper should be titled 
“Panglosses and Cassandras” since Candide’s optimism derives from his teacher, and is generally 
referred to as Panglossian Optimism (Candide himself is disillusioned by the end of Voltaire’s novel). 
See Frederick Schauer, Rights, Constitutions, and the Perils of Panglossianism, 28 OXFORD J. OF 
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3092336. However, my preference is 
alliteration over accuracy. 
9. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cassandra-Greek-
mythology (last updated Feb. 16, 2018).  











I. TECHNOLOGY ENTERS THE TEMPLE 
In this Part, I will discuss in some detail the four free speech cases 
decided by the Supreme Court during Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure that 
touch upon technology. As I noted in the introduction, only two of these 
cases—Packingham and Brown—deal directly with new technology and its 
implications for free speech. However, because the other two decisions were 
at least influenced by or implicate changing technology, they are worth 
some consideration to reveal patterns. I discuss the cases in reverse 
chronological order both because the most recent decision in this series, 
Packingham, is the most enlightening, and because the impact of technology 
on free speech issues has obviously accelerated in recent years. 
I also should begin with a definitional clarification and some caveats. In 
the course of analyzing the cases that follow, I am seeking to classify the 
participating Justices as technology optimists (Candides) or technology 
pessimists (Cassandras). Of course, with rare exceptions, most cases do not 
require Justices to explicitly express hopes or fears about technology 
(though both Brown and Packingham did require just that). Therefore, when 
clear statements about technology are lacking, I use as my proxy for 
optimism or pessimism attitudes towards regulation of technology, on the 
assumption that technology optimists generally think regulation 
unnecessary and harmful, while pessimists think regulation is needed to 
fend of the dangers posed by technology. Silicon Valley is, after all, full of 
libertarians. But this proxy is concededly imperfect, since other factors can 
also influence attitudes towards regulation. Another source of uncertainty is 
that not every Justice writes in every case. When a Justice does not write, 
but rather joins an opinion authored by another Justice (whether a majority 
opinion or otherwise), I attribute the author’s attitudes to the joining Justice. 
Again, however, this is an imperfect proxy, because other factors (including 
simply a desire for consensus) might lead a Justice to join an opinion he or 
she does not fully agree with. In my analysis I do identify situation when I 
believe these sorts of dynamics might be involved, but there are always 
uncertainties in analyzing silence. 
Despite these uncertainties and caveats, I do believe there is value in the 
exercise I am undertaking here. Attitudes towards technology matter, and 
are likely to matter even more going forward. And given the ages of the 
Justices (all of whom became adults in the pre-Internet era), substantial 
variation in how familiar and comfortable they are with technology is 
inevitable. It may seem odd that these sorts of subterranean attitudes will in 
all likelihood shape free speech law going forward—but that is hardly the 
only or even most obvious oddity in modern constitutional law. Regardless, 












A. Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) 
The most recent and most striking technology/free speech decision of the 
Roberts Court, which also not coincidentally engaged the Court for the first 
time with the most important modern technological development affecting 
free speech—the spread of social media—was the 2017 decision in 
Packingham v. North Carolina.10 Packingham involved a challenge to a 
North Carolina statute that forbade any registered sex offender from 
accessing “a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender 
knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create 
or maintain personal Web pages.”11 Packingham, a registered sex offender, 
posted a statement on Facebook (under a fictitious name) celebrating his 
success in having a traffic ticket against him dismissed.12 He was caught, 
convicted of violating § 14-202.5, and given a suspended prison sentence.13 
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals invalidated the statute, but 
the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed on the remarkable grounds that 
denying Packingham access to websites such as Facebook did not violate 
his First Amendment rights because Packingham remained able to access 
sites such as the Paula Deen Network and local television station websites 
which serve the “same or similar” functions as Facebook.14 
On certiorari, all eight Justices agreed that the North Carolina statute was 
unconstitutional.15 However, there was sharp disagreement among them 
regarding both the scope of the statute and the reason that the law failed to 
pass constitutional muster. On the issue of scope, the uncertainty concerned 
whether the North Carolina statute’s broad definition of the term “social 
networking” websites encompassed not only sites generally understood to 
be social media such as Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter, but also sites such 
as Amazon.com, Washingtonpost.com, and Webmd.com, which permit 
visitors to communicate with each other and share information (often 
through review or comment sections).16 The majority opinion authored by 
Justice Kennedy, and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, assumed for the purposes of the decision that the statute did not 
reach sites such as Amazon.17 Nonetheless, the majority concluded that the 
law was unconstitutional because it failed the narrow tailoring requirement 
                                                 
10. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
11. Id. at 1733 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-202.5(a), (e) (2015)).  
12. Id. at 1734. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 1735 (quoting State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 747 (2015)).  
15. The case was argued after Justice Scalia’s death, but before Justice Gorsuch joined the 
Court. 
16. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736–37. 
17. Id. 











of the Court’s “intermediate scrutiny” test applicable to content-neutral 
restrictions on speech.18 Emphasizing the importance of social media to 
modern communications, the majority concluded that the North Carolina 
law suppressed far more speech than necessary to achieve the State’s 
concededly important goal of preventing sexual abuse of children.19 
Justice Alito wrote a separate opinion concurring only the judgment, 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. Central to Justice 
Alito’s reasoning was his conclusion that the North Carolina law denied sex 
offenders access to “an enormous number of websites” including Amazon, 
Webmd, and many news websites.20 Because such sites were extremely 
unlikely to be used to facilitate sexual abuse of a child, he too concluded the 
law failed narrow tailoring. Crucially, however, in the closing section of his 
opinion Justice Alito strongly suggested that he might well have voted to 
uphold a more narrowly written statute focused on true social media, 
because of the importance of the State’s interest in protecting children.21 
More than their differing readings of the challenged statute, however, 
what truly separates the Justices in the Packingham case is their vastly 
different attitudes towards the Internet and social media. Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion begins his substantive discussion by noting the traditional 
importance of public forums such as streets and parks for public dialogue. 
He then says, in a memorable phrase, that “[w]hile in the past there may 
have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial 
sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is 
cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general . . . and 
social media in particular.”22 He goes on to discuss the manifold functions 
of the Internet, especially social media, in sharing information and views, 
and describes the advent of this new technology as a “revolution.”23 He 
concludes that because the Packingham “case is one of the first this Court 
has taken to address the relationship between the First Amendment and the 
modern Internet . . . the Court must exercise extreme caution before 
suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant protection for access to 
vast networks in that medium.”24 
Justice Alito’s attitude towards modern technology can only be described 
as the polar opposite of Justice Kennedy’s. He begins his opinion by 
explicitly noting that he was writing separately because of the majority’s 
“undisciplined dicta [and] musings that seem to equate the entirety of the 
                                                 
18. Id. at 1736. 
19. Id. at 1737. 
20. Id. at 1740–43 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
21. Id. at 1743–44. 
22. Id. at 1735 (quoting Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).  













Internet with public streets and parks.”25 In his view, “there are important 
differences between cyberspace and the physical world” such as anonymity 
and invisibility that cut in favor of, not against, state regulatory authority, 
because of the risk that sex offenders and others can take advantage of these 
features.26 Precisely because of the unique nature of cyberspace, Alito 
concludes, the Court should be “cautious in applying our free speech 
precedents to the [I]nternet.”27 
SCORECARD: 
Candides: Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan 
Cassandras: Alito, Roberts, Thomas 
B. FCC v. Fox Television Stations (2012 and 2009) 
The Court’s two decisions in the long-lasting FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations litigation, one in 200928 and the other in 2012,29 did not directly 
involve a new technology or form of media. To the contrary, they involved 
regulation of the oldest of the electronic mass media, broadcast television 
and radio. Moreover, neither decision directly addressed First Amendment 
issues. However, because the cases indirectly raised the question of how the 
evolution of the mass media in response to technological change should 
impact regulation of older media, and because the First Amendment 
hovered in the background of the litigation throughout, I treat the case as an 
honorary member of the free speech/technology club. 
The broad issue in the Fox Television Stations cases was the legality of 
the Federal Communications Commission’s new interpretation of its 
longstanding rule against indecent language on broadcast media to prohibit 
even a single utterance of an expletive in a nonliteral manner.30 Earlier, the 
FCC had limited findings of liability to repeated or explicit uses of 
expletives but had not considered “fleeting expletives” used in a nonliteral 
way to be indecent. In 2004, in response to complaints directed at a 
comment made by Bono, the lead singer of U-2, during the Golden Globe 
Awards, that “this is really, really, fucking brilliant,”31 the FCC reversed 
course. It held that even a single, obviously nonliteral use of the “F-Word” 
was inherently indecent (though bizarrely, the FCC also said that even 
Bono’s use of the word had a “sexual connotation”). The Fox cases 
themselves arose not from the Bono incident, but from two other incidents 
                                                 
25. Id. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
26. Id. at 1743–44. 
27. Id. at 1744. 
28. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) [hereinafter Fox I]. 
29. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. 239 (2012) [hereinafter Fox II]. 
30. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 508–09. 
31. Id. at 509. 











in which expletives were uttered on air, both of which occurred before the 
FCC had announced its new interpretation in 2004 (one involving Cher, and 
the other involving Paris Hilton and Nicole Richie) in response to which the 
FCC enforced its new policy, though without imposing financial sanctions. 
The issue in the first Fox decision was whether the FCC’s decision to 
reinterpret its indecency policy violated the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas and Alito in its entirety, and Justice Kennedy almost in its 
entirety, ruled that it did not.32 The details are not important for our 
purposes, except to note the administrative law principle that emerged, or 
was confirmed, by the decision was that an agency’s change in policy or 
legal interpretation does not impose any greater obligation of explanation 
on agencies than the original formulation of policy or law.33 The Court then 
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the broadcasters’ 
First Amendment challenge to the new policy.34 Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented essentially on the grounds that the FCC had 
not adequately explained its change of course.35 
For our purposes, however, the crucial opinion in the case was neither 
the majority opinion nor any of the dissents (nor, for that matter, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence). It was rather Justice Thomas’s concurring 
opinion.36 In it, Justice Thomas pointed out that the original 1978 decision 
of the Supreme Court upholding the FCC’s indecency policy, FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation,37 was based firmly on the premise (established in 
Pacifica’s predecessor decision Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC38) that the 
broadcast media received far less First Amendment protection than other 
technologies.39 He also noted that since Pacifica, the Court had consistently 
refused to extend that lower level of protection to other media such as 
telephone dial-in services, cable television, and the Internet, and so had 
consistently struck down attempts to ban indecent language on those 
platforms.40 He argued, however, that the massive technological changes 
since 1978, notably the fact that most consumers today receive broadcast 
television via cable television or the Internet, made the lower standard 
applicable to broadcast indefensible.41 The reasons were two-fold. First, 
                                                 
32. Id. at 517–18.  
33. Id. at 514–15. 
34. Id. at 529–30. 
35. Id. at 552–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
36. Id. at 530–35 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
37. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
38. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
39. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 530–35 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
40. Id. at 532–33 (Thomas, J., concurring). 












modern technology had fatally undermined the driving assumptions of Red 
Lion and Pacifica that the broadcast media was subject to scarcity and was 
"uniquely pervasive.”42 And second, from the viewers’ perspective 
“broadcast” materials viewed via their cable service or internet streaming 
was indistinguishable from other content that received full First 
Amendment protection, making differential regulatory treatment difficult to 
defend.43 Therefore, he urged the Court to reconsider Red Lion and 
Pacifica.44 
On remand from Fox I, the Court of Appeals struck down the FCC’s new 
indecency policy as unconstitutionally vague.45 The Supreme Court once 
again granted review and this time affirmed, but on extremely narrow 
grounds. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion (joined by all the participating 
Justices46 except Ginsburg) found that the FCC’s finding of liability for the 
Fox broadcasts (and one additional one involving fleeting nudity), all of 
which aired before the FCC had announced its new policy in the Bono case, 
violated the Due Process vagueness doctrine for failure to give fair notice.47 
At the end his opinion, Justice Kennedy acknowledged both the attacks on 
Pacifica raised by litigants and the underlying First Amendment issue, but 
declined to address any of them.48 Justice Ginsburg filed a brief opinion 
concurring in the judgment, arguing that Pacifica was wrong when decided 
but in any event required reconsideration in light of subsequent 
technological changes (citing Justice Thomas’s opinion in Fox I).49 
In the Fox decisions, most of the Justices were silent about the 
implications of technological change for regulatory policy towards 
broadcasting. Two Justices, however, took forthright positions indicating 
that in their view technology did matter, and cut in favor of increasing 
constitutional protections for broadcasting. That makes them Candides. 
SCORECARD: 





                                                 
42. Id. at 533 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
43. Id. at 534 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
44. Id. at 532–35 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
45. Fox II, 567 U.S. at 251–52. 
46. Justice Sotomayor did not participate. 
47. Fox II, 567 U.S. at 253–54. 
48. Id. at 258. 
49. Id. at 259 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 











C. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn. (2011) 
As I noted earlier, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n50 and 
Packingham are the two Roberts Court cases that directly considered how 
to apply First Amendment doctrine to new technologies. This time, 
however, the new technology was not the Internet, it was video games. In 
2005 California passed a statute banning the sale or rental of violent video 
games to minors (and requiring that such games be labeled “18”).51 In 
Brown, the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by 
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, struck down this 
statute.52 It held that the California law was a content-based restriction on 
free speech subject to strict scrutiny,53 which it could not possibly survive 
given that the actual evidence that violent video games harm minors is very 
limited.54 On the first crucial question of whether video games were entitled 
to First Amendment protection, California conceded that they were but the 
majority nonetheless emphasized that the fact that such games constituted 
“entertainment” did not take them out of the First Amendment.55 Moreover, 
later in the opinion, when California argued that the “interactive” nature of 
video games made them particularly harmful, the Court flatly rejected this 
view with a few succinct comments to the effect that all literature is 
interactive to some extent and so this made no difference.56 Notably, the 
Court seemed utterly unmoved by California’s (and the dissent’s) 
arguments that the highly visual and immersive nature of video games made 
them different in kind from purely written or oral forms of communication. 
Most of the majority opinion considers (and rejects) the argument that 
violent speech directed at children should be considered “low-value” and so 
unprotected for First Amendment purposes, a doctrinal issue not relevant to 
this article.57 But on the fundamental question of how the First Amendment 
applies to a new and potentially worrisome technology the majority was 
clear that it applies fully. 
Three Justices disagreed with this approach.58 In an opinion concurring 
in the judgment, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, raised the 
                                                 
50. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
51. Id. at 789. 
52. Id. at 805. 
53. Id. at 799. 
54. Id. at 799–801. 
55. Id. at 790. 
56. Id. at 798. 
57. Id. at 792–99. 
58. Justice Thomas dissented from the Court’s judgment, but on the novel ground that minors 
had no First Amendment rights to receive information independent of their parents. Id. at 821–39 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). As Justice Thomas did not address the implications of novel technology, in 












“possibility that the experience of playing video games (and the effects on 
minors of playing violent video games) may be very different from anything 
that we have seen before.”59 He noted that playing video games, unlike 
reading or watching television or a movie, requires the player to physically 
participate in the action, especially in newer games that respond to physical 
motions by players rather than the use of joysticks.60 He also noted that “[i]n 
some of these games, the violence is astounding.”61 And finally, he worried 
that the advent of newer technology such as virtual reality (though he did 
not use those words, this being 2011) raised the possibility that video games 
would become almost indistinguishable from real life.62 For all of those 
reasons, he would have left open the possibility that video games should be 
subject to greater regulation than other forms of speech, though he 
concluded that this particular statute was unconstitutionally vague.63 
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the California law should be 
upheld. In a long opinion, Breyer carefully examined the available empirical 
evidence regarding the impact of video games (including journal articles 
and studies not in the record), concluding that there was sufficient evidence 
for California to conclude that violent interactive entertainment did cause 
aggressive behavior in children.64 Therefore, he would have concluded that 
the California statute survived even strict scrutiny.65 Justice Breyer did not 
rely as explicitly as Justice Alito on the fact that video games were a novel 
technology to defend the California law, but there seems little doubt that 
concerns about new technology were a key factor in his vote. Consider the 
fact (pointed out by the majority) that the key empirical study relied upon 
by California suggested that the effects of playing violent video games on 
minors were about the same as that of watching Bugs Bunny or Road 
Runner cartoons, or of viewing pictures of guns.66 But imagine a statute 
banning children from viewing Warner Brothers cartoons. Or imagine a law 
prohibiting pictures of guns in books directed at minors. Is it conceivable 
that Justice Breyer would have voted to uphold such laws, or even apply the 
watered-down version of strict scrutiny he used in Brown? The answer 
seems obvious, and makes Breyer a fellow Cassandra to Alito and Roberts 
in this case. 
SCORECARD: 
Candides: Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan 
                                                 
59. Id. at 816 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
60. Id. at 817–18 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
61. Id. at 818 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
62. Id. at 819–20 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
63. Id. at 820–21 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
64. Id. at 849–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 847 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 800–01. 











Cassandras: Alito, Roberts, Breyer 
Neutral: Thomas 
D. Sorrell v. IMS Health (2011) 
The final case we examine, Sorrell v. IMS Health,67 touches upon one of 
the most significant and controversial free speech issues likely to arise in 
the digital era: the problem of Big Data. Unusually, however, the case did 
not involve either mass media or the Internet as such; instead, it involved 
data mining as a means of strengthening advertising. But no less than 
Packingham, Sorrell directly poses the question of how First Amendment 
doctrine and law should respond to radically new forms of technology and 
“speech.” 
The issue in Sorrell v. IMS Health was the constitutionality of a Vermont 
statute that regulated the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records 
containing information about the prescribing practices of individual 
doctors.68 In practice, because of the language of the statute and various 
exceptions, the effect of the statute was to bar the sale of prescriber-
identifying data to data miners such as IMS Health, who in turn analyzed 
the data on behalf of pharmaceutical manufacturers for use in the latter’s 
efforts to market prescription drugs to individual doctors.69 
The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito and Sotomayor, begins by 
describing the Vermont law as enacting “content- and speaker-based 
restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying 
information.”70 As such, the majority strongly suggests that the statute 
should be subject to “heightened judicial scrutiny” and cites cases applying 
strict scrutiny.71 Crucially, in reaching this conclusion, the Court responded 
to an argument made by Vermont, that the sale, transfer, and use of 
prescriber-identifying information constituted conduct, not speech, and 
therefore should not receive any First Amendment protection—an 
argument, it should be noted, that the First Circuit had accepted in a related 
case.72 The Court sharply disagreed, stating that “the creation and 
dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First 
Amendment”73 because “[f]acts, after all, are the beginning point for much 
of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to 
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conduct human affairs.”74 Ultimately, the Court did not resolve the question 
of whether the sale of data constitutes speech, though it did say that “[t]here 
is a strong argument that prescriber-identifying information is speech for 
First Amendment purposes.”75 Instead, the Court held that because 
Vermont’s restrictions on marketing by pharmaceutical companies clearly 
triggered the commercial speech doctrine, and because the Vermont statute 
could not even survive the intermediate scrutiny applicable to commercial 
speech restrictions, the issue could be left for another day.76 But the 
implication of the majority opinion—joined by six Justices, it should be 
noted—was crystal-clear: Data is speech,77 and therefore, any attempt to 
regulate the sale, use, or transfer of Big Data necessarily triggers stringent 
First Amendment scrutiny. 
The dissenting Justices in Sorrell (Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan) did not 
directly address the question of how to categorize sales of data under the 
First Amendment, arguing instead that because Vermont’s statute operated 
within a heavily regulated industry (pharmaceuticals), and because the data 
at issue existed only as a byproduct of government regulation, the Vermont 
statute should be treated as a species of economic regulation rather than a 
regulation of speech.78 Ultimately, however, it is clear that for the dissenters 
the fact that this particular statute itself regulated only information, as 
opposed to regulating conduct in a way that incidentally affects speech, 
made no difference.79 As such, while the dissenters did not speak directly to 
the issue, the tone of Justice Breyer’s opinion leaves little doubt that he 
would be inclined to treat the regulation of data as a form of economic 
regulation rather than as a law raising core First Amendment issues. 
SCORECARD: 
Candides: Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor 
Cassandras: Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan 
II. CONFIDENCE AND CONCERNS 
So what can we learn from all of this? Let us start with what we can glean 
about the attitudes of individual Justices towards technology. And in the 
course of doing so, we might indulge in a bit of speculation as to why the 
Justices lean the way they do. I should note that because my primary 
purpose here is to discern future implications, I consider below only the 
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Justices serving as of this writing (Spring 2018), with the exception of 
Justice Gorsuch who did not participate in any of the cases discussed in Part 
I, and therefore whom it is too early to assess—though the fact that Justice 
Gorsuch was still in his twenties at the beginning of the Internet era gives 
me some hope. I do not therefore further explore the perhaps-surprising fact 
that Justice Scalia emerges as something of a Candide in these cases, albeit 
he did not have the opportunity to voice his views in Packingham. 
The one obvious and immediate conclusion that jumps out from the cases 
is that the Candide-in-Chief of the Roberts Court, the most consistent 
technology optimist, is Justice Kennedy. In three of the four cases discussed 
he came out clearly on the Candide side, and was the author of the most 
technology-embracing free speech opinion of the Roberts Court, the 
majority opinion in Packingham. And in the Fox Television Stations 
“fleeting expletives” litigation80 Kennedy was merely silent, giving no 
reason to believe he necessarily opposed extending stronger constitutional 
protection to the broadcast media. Finally, Justice Kennedy’s recent support 
for technology is consistent with his actions in pre-Roberts Court cases. 
Notably, during the Rehnquist Court Kennedy authored two opinions 
arguing that the strongest levels of constitutional protections should be 
accorded to cable television programming.81 Justice Kennedy’s optimism 
with regards to technology, moreover, is consistent with the fact that he is 
generally the most speech-protective Justice on the modern Court.82 Given 
his strong support for free speech generally, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Justice Kennedy’s inclination to extend the strongest First Amendment 
protections to new technologies seems both consistent and neigh absolute. 
The other Roberts Court Justice who is quite clearly a firm Candide is 
Justice Sotomayor. Like Justice Kennedy, Sotomayor was with the 
Candides in the three cases in which the Justices directly addressed 
technology, and like Kennedy she was merely silent in Fox Television. I 
place her second on this scale to Kennedy only because she did not author 
the strikingly idealistic language of the majority opinion in Packingham. 
But her voting record suggests that she too strongly supports free speech 
rights on all technology platforms, not just traditional media such as print. 
Another Justice who emerges as a likely strong Candide is Justice 
Ginsburg. She joined the technology optimists in both of the key cases, 
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Packingham and Brown, and in the second Fox Television Stations decision 
she went out of her way to advocate an approach that would have finally 
extended full First Amendment protection to the broadcast media after over 
forty years of minimal protection.83 The only other Justice to express 
agreement with this view (in the first Fox Television Stations decision) was 
Justice Thomas. And it is noteworthy that Ginsburg was the only Justice to 
join both of Justice Kennedy’s strong pro-cable television opinions in the 
pre-Roberts Court era (though to be fair, Justice Sotomayor was not on the 
Court when either case was decided). The only exception to this pattern of 
technology-optimism was of course Justice Ginsburg’s vote in Sorrell v. 
IMS Health; but Sorrell is I think explicable on other grounds. As noted 
earlier, Justice Breyer’s dissent analyzed the Vermont statute challenged in 
Sorrell as a species of economic regulation because it operated in a highly 
regulated industry, and involved information (that is to say “data”) that 
existed only as a result of government regulation.84 The three dissenters thus 
did not appear to see Sorrell as a case about technology or speech, or even 
Big Data in general. I therefore do not take Justice Ginsburg’s vote in 
Sorrell as any sort of indication that when posed more directly with the 
question of whether data generally deserves First Amendment protections, 
she will necessarily become a Cassandra. 
Finally, on the Candide side, Justice Kagan also emerges as a likely 
member of the optimists’ club for basically the same reasons as Justice 
Ginsburg. She voted consistently with the Candides in every case except 
Sorrell, and her vote in Sorrell is probably explicable on the same grounds 
as that of Justice Ginsburg. My only hesitation in classifying Kagan, and 
why I think she may be a more cautious Candide than the others, is Justice 
Kagan’s silence in the major technology cases combined with a broader 
sense that she (like Justice Breyer, as I will discuss) inclines towards greater 
caution in expanding constitutional rights, including notably First 
Amendment rights, 85 than the strong Candides. But these are only 
impressions, and for now we can assume that Justice Kagan is generally 
inclined to see technology in a positive light. 
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Turning now to the Cassandras, two Justices immediately emerge as 
strong technology pessimists: Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Both 
of them took firmly pessimistic approaches towards technology in the two 
key cases, Packingham and Brown, and there is nothing else in their actions 
suggesting that their views are in any way otherwise (unlike Justice Thomas, 
as we shall see). Both were silent regarding technology in the two Fox 
Television Stations decisions, and so the only countervailing evidence is 
their votes in Sorrell to strike down data restrictions. But it is my view that 
Justice Alito’s and Chief Justice Roberts’s votes in Sorrell are explicable 
for the obverse reasons to Justices Ginsburg’s and Kagan’s votes in that 
case. Sorrell might be thought of as a technology case (Justice Kennedy 
certainly seemed to see it as such), but it could just as easily be seen to be a 
case about business regulation, which Roberts and Alito are of course 
generally hostile to.86 But when the business-regulation overlay is removed, 
both Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts seem thoroughly skeptical 
about the value of, versus the risks posed by, new technology. 
It is worth noting that Justice Alito’s doubts about the social utility of 
free speech using new technology parallels his general skepticism about free 
speech. Alito was, after all, the sole dissenter in two crucial non-technology 
Roberts Court cases extending the scope of First Amendment protections, 
Snyder v. Phelps87 and United States v. Stevens.88 And he has shown little 
inclination, at least outside of commercial or corporate contexts, to protect 
expressive liberties. But the same cannot be said of Chief Justice Roberts. 
He not only joined but in fact authored both Snyder v. Phelps and Stevens, 
and he also joined the most speech-protective opinion in another landmark 
non-technology case, United States v. Alvarez.89 For the Chief Justice, then, 
the problem is not speech as such, it is the risks and threat posed by new 
technology. 
Turning to Justice Thomas, it would appear that he is divided or perhaps 
uncertain. Thomas was a firm Cassandra in Packingham, but he displayed 
important Candide-like inclinations in Fox Television Stations. In Brown he 
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was silent on the technology issue, and in Playboy Entertainment Group, 
one of the pre-Roberts era cable television decisions authored by Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Thomas provided the key, fifth vote for extending strong 
First Amendment protections to that technology (and to non-obscene, 
sexually explicit speech).90 Finally, his vote in Sorrell might (but might not) 
reflect a view on the constitutional status of Big Data for the same reasons 
as discussed with respect to Alito and Roberts.91 Further compounding the 
difficulty is the fact that Justice Thomas’s preferred approach to 
constitutional interpretation—Originalism92—naturally has little to offer on 
the question of new technologies.93 So with regards to Justice Thomas, we 
must satisfy ourselves with uncertainty. 
Finally, we come to Justice Breyer. Even more than Justice Thomas, 
Justice Breyer comes off as an enigma. He was with the Candides in 
Packingham, but a firm Cassandra in Brown. He dissented in Sorrell, but 
again seemingly for reasons unrelated to technology. And he was silent on 
technology in Fox Television Stations. Looking to earlier cases, Justice 
Breyer wrote the main dissent (for four Justices) in Playboy Entertainment 
Group, the decision discussed above in which Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion extended strong constitutional protections to cable television.94 
Ironically, then, despite being a native of San Francisco Justice Breyer 
appears to be uncertain about how to weigh the benefits and risks of new 
technology. Or perhaps more to the point, in these cases Justice Breyer’s 
general friendliness towards regulation is seemingly at war with his general 
support for constitutional rights. 
FINAL SCORECARD 
Candides: Kennedy, Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Kagan 
Cassandras: Roberts, Alito 
Uncertain: Thomas, Breyer, (Gorsuch) 
 
Turning to the question of why certain Justices are inclined to be 
Candides and others Cassandras, it is of course impossible to say for sure, 
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and certainly I have no desire to engage in armchair psychoanalysis on the 
question. I do think, however, that a broad explanation does emerge, an 
explanation that is consistent with, and indeed closely tied to, Greg 
Magarian’s analysis of Managed Speech on the Roberts Court.95 The 
answer, in short, is attitudes towards order and turbulence. In this sense, the 
division on the Roberts Court mirrors the longstanding tension in American 
political thinking between Jeffersonians who embrace change and 
individual autonomy at the cost of occasional disorder,96 and Hamiltonians 
who embrace order at the cost of occasional limits on liberty.97 
For the Cassandras, the problem I suspect can be summarized in a 
nutshell: technology is always disruptive, but given the current pace of 
technological change, today that disruption often resembles chaos. Ten 
years ago, social media barely existed and had no consequential role in the 
organizing of society. Today, our President uses social media as his primary 
tool to build and shape his political support, and there are overwhelming 
indications that foreign agents aggressively used social media to try and 
manipulate American democracy in the 2016 elections.98 More specifically, 
technology threatens to substantially magnify the kinds of risks and 
concerns that have always been advanced to restrict free speech, most 
notably the protection of children. It is surely no coincidence that protecting 
children was the justification for the regulations in both Packingham and 
Brown. And it is similarly unsurprising that for Cassandras, such elevated 
fears justify restrictions on new technologies that they may not have 
permitted to be imposed on traditional media such as print. Indeed, children 
were the issue in Fox Television Stations as well, and again the Court as a 
whole’s reluctance to extend full constitutional protections to broadcasting 
may well have been a product of these sorts of fears. Moreover, as discussed 
in Part III below,99 there is no reason to believe that the Cassandras’ need to 
preserve order and traditional social structures and values will be limited to 
the protection of children. And if it is not, the technology skepticism of the 
Cassandras will persist. 
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Candides are in some ways easier to understand than Cassandras. The 
language of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Packingham drips with 
the Utopianism of the early Internet era,100 an attitude that remains an 
important element of tech culture today. How can universal access to cheap 
speech possibly be bad? The truth, however, is that cheap speech can in fact 
cause substantial harm.101 Once that reality is accepted, the question then 
becomes whether the promise of such speech outweighs the risks it poses. 
Why Candides readily accept that it does is not a question I can answer fully, 
except to repeat my earlier suggestion that Candides almost certainly have 
a greater tolerance for disorder than Cassandras, which shifts the balance 
from their perspective. 
III. WHAT COMES NEXT? 
Turning now to the final question of what the existing Roberts Court 
technology cases portend for the future, I am modestly (but only modestly) 
optimistic that the Candides will generally prevail, and that the Court will 
not instinctively respond with fear to new technology. Put differently, I 
think it likely, but not certain, that a working majority of the Roberts Court 
will vote to fend off heavy-handed efforts to assert state control over new 
technology such as the Internet and social media. But I am only modestly 
optimistic because I fear that the obvious threats and concerns associated 
with that technology could easily drive a Court generally inclined towards 
order and hierarchy (as Magarian illustrates this Court is102) towards a more 
fearful and so restrictive attitude. 
My optimism arises primarily from the fact that Candides appear to 
outnumber Cassandras on the Roberts Court. I found three, probably four 
strong Candides, and only two clear Cassandras. As such, for technology 
optimists to prevail in any particular case, they need to convince only one 
of the three divided or uncertain Justices: Thomas, Breyer and Gorsuch. For 
the Cassandras to win, however, they must convince all three. Adding to 
that the general receptivity of the Roberts Court to free speech claims, there 
are reasons to believe that aggressive new regulation of free expression via 
new technologies will not succeed. 
One uncertainty concerns the Candides. At least until recently, the 
benefits of technology in terms of facilitating access to speech and speech 
platforms for almost everyone seemed obvious to all. And concerns about 
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the impact of technology seemed overstated—Cass Sunstein, who 
presciently predicted many of the concerns now emerging regarding 
political polarization and loss of even basic consensus regarding fact, was 
at the time he first expressed these ideas an outlier.103 As such, the Candides’ 
embrace of technology seemed natural. But as the threats posed by the 
Internet and social media to social order and stability become more widely 
understood and accepted, one wonders whether the Candides will retain 
their faith that unregulated technology usually makes the world a better 
place. If they do not, then that could cause a shifting of the balance on the 
Roberts Court against technology. 
Another question that arises, but to date remains unclear, is whether the 
Cassandras of the Roberts Court will extend their technology skepticism to 
situations where the social interests invoked to justify regulation are serious, 
but not tied to protecting children. If the Cassandras have primarily been 
driven by concerns about children, then that too portends well for new 
technology. But there is no particular reason to believe that their concerns 
are so limited. How, for example, will those Justices evaluate efforts to 
protect personal privacy, given the enormously greater privacy harms 
enabled by the Internet in general and social media in particular?104 Or what 
about the concerns recently so prominent in the press regarding “fake news” 
and the use of technology to influence/interfere with democratic politics?105 
Also consider the problem of children employing social media off-campus 
in ways that potentially interfere with the operations of schools—a topic of 
extensive lower court litigation that the Court has yet to take on.106 All of 
these developments represent threats to traditional forms of order and 
hierarchy, both social and political, which suggests that technology 
pessimists will remain pessimists, and furthermore that some centrists and 
even some optimists might shift. But, of course, it is also true that concerns 
about the safety and wellbeing of children are uniquely powerful and 
persuasive, suggesting that in other spheres at least some hitherto 
pessimistic Justices might be more inclined to take free-speech claims 
seriously. 
Perhaps the most important variable in determining how the 
constitutional law of free speech over the Internet develops in the coming 
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years concerns the nature of the regulatory initiatives that emerge from 
Congress, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and state 
legislatures. If past history is any guide, content-neutral structural 
regulations such as the Net Neutrality policy adopted by the Obama-era 
FCC107 (and recently repealed by the Trump-era FCC108) are likely to fare 
well in courts and the Court, especially given the existence of precedent, 
authored notably by Justice Kennedy, upholding similar structural 
regulations of cable television.109 I also would expect that narrowly focused 
legislation, aimed at serious problems generated by the reality of cheap 
speech and the Internet and without significant collateral consequences, also 
will likely fare well. A prominent example would be regulation prohibiting 
“revenge porn,” a repulsive practice whereby former romantic partners 
(usually male) post on the Internet revealing pictures of their former partner, 
which were typically voluntarily shared during the relationship.110 Such 
laws, assuming that they can be written clearly and narrowly (a big if 
perhaps), target a social practice with privacy ramifications which should 
be obvious to anyone, including any judge, but which do not otherwise seem 
to threaten the free flow of information. It should be noted that “revenge 
porn” is necessarily a creature of the Internet, since before cheap speech 
private persons would never have been able to obtain access to mass-
distribution platforms for the purpose of pursuing their unpleasant, personal 
agendas. So in that sense, revenge porn legislation is a regulation of new 
technology; but it seems a thoroughly unproblematic one. 
Harder is the problem of Big Data and personal privacy writ large. As 
discussed earlier, in the Sorrell case a majority of the Court strongly 
indicated that it would treat data as speech, and therefore subject regulations 
of data to stringent First Amendment scrutiny. It is also noteworthy that the 
two clearest Candides on the Court, Justice Kennedy (who wrote the 
opinion) and Justice Sotomayor (who joined it) can be assumed to be 
strongly committed to this position. On the other hand, the other two 
potential Candides, Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, were in dissent in Sorrell; 
and the two primary Cassandras, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, 
joined the majority opinion. Sorrell is thus a bit of a mess because of the 
many cross-currents in the case, including issues of data and technology, 
but also commercial speech and proper treatment of highly-regulated 
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industries such as pharmaceuticals. And on the flip side, the governmental 
interests at stake in Sorrell were frankly trivial and suspect. The privacy at 
issue was the “right” of doctors to remain anonymous regarding what drugs 
they prescribe.111 But why this is a serious privacy interest, given that 
doctors have always operated in a highly regulated environment, remains 
unclear. Moreover, the way the Vermont legislation was written, it only 
protected doctors’ privacy vis-à-vis pharmaceutical companies, not other 
actors such as regulators or academics.112 Presumably the interest the 
legislation advanced, therefore, was to shield doctors from marketing by 
pharmaceutical companies; but it is very difficult to understand why anyone 
should take this concern seriously given that doctors remain free at all times 
to simply refuse to meet marketers.113 And if the state interest is to prevent 
pharmaceutical companies from convincing doctors to prescribe brand 
name rather than generic drugs, as was likely the case, the Sorrell majority 
quite rightly rejected this as paternalistic and illegitimate.114 
The difficult question, then, is how the Court would react to a law that 
restricted data practices in the technology sector rather than a traditionally 
regulated industry, but that also had real and serious privacy justifications. 
Examples might include Germany’s recent efforts to prevent Facebook from 
incorporating data obtained from use of other Facebook-owned apps such 
as WhatsApp or Instagram into Facebook profiles.115 Or it might be a more 
direct challenge to data transfers, such as imposing onerous consent 
requirements before permitting any inter-company sales of personal data—
a regulatory outcome that looks increasingly likely given recent revelations 
about Facebook’s data practices and the misuse of Facebook profiles by 
Cambridge Analytica during the 2016 election.116 Either way, the conflict is 
clear: such laws substantially burden the movement of data—i.e., under the 
Sorrell dictum they burden “speech”—but they also advance significant 
personal privacy interests. Based on my reading of Sorrell, I am fairly 
confident that the two main Candides on the Court—Kennedy and 
Sotomayor—will view such regulations at a minimum with a great deal of 
suspicion because of the onerous and technology-specific impact of such 
laws. I am less clear of the other Justices, however. The Cassandras and 
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Justice Thomas, it seems likely, will be torn between their concerns about 
the impact of technology on privacy and their general hostility to business 
regulation. And the others (Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan) are simply inscrutable 
to me as they are likely to be sympathetic both to regulation and to free 
speech concerns. Aside from the obvious bromide that the narrower and 
better-tailored the law the more likely it is to survive, this remains an area 
of profound uncertainty. 
Moving away from the commercial sphere, and direct regulation of tech 
or data, let us consider now the problem of school children’s off-campus 
use of social media. As noted earlier, there is a substantial jurisprudence in 
the lower courts on this subject, but the Supreme Court has failed to address 
the issue despite substantial disagreements among the lower courts.117 This 
again is a situation where there are strong, competing considerations. One 
factor, cutting in favor of speech protections, is that Packingham suggests 
the Candides on the Court, along with at least some centrists, will be 
suspicious of intrusions on social media because of its role as the new forum 
for social discourse. On the other hand, in the only Roberts Court case 
addressing student free speech rights—Morse v. Frederick118—the Court 
was notably unsympathetic to the free speech claim despite minimal 
evidence that the speech at issue, the infamous “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” 
banner, actually disrupted school activities. But to complicate matters 
further, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association the majority, 
which included all of the Court Candides, adopted a position strongly 
supportive of the off-campus free speech rights of minors,119 and the social 
media cases in the lower courts typically involve off-campus speech. These 
disputes represent the perfect storm for the Roberts Court, placing the 
Court’s general inclinations to maintain order and traditional hierarchies 
against its general support of both free speech and new technology. At a 
minimum, we can be confident that given the views expressed by Justice 
Thomas in Morse120 and in Brown,121 he will probably reject any First 
Amendment claim brought by minors. As for the others, my prediction, such 
as it is, is that the Candides will, with the support of Justice Breyer (given 
his vote in Packingham), prevail when such a case comes to the Court; but 
I confess that Justice Breyer’s vote remains highly uncertain, especially 
given his equivocation in Morse,122 suggesting that Justice Gorsuch may 
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well cast the deciding vote. And if the off-campus speech in the first case to 
reach the Court is particularly troublesome (threats of violence or the like), 
all bets are off. 
Finally, we come to the hardest and most amorphous problem, the 
potential regulation of “fake news” or other deceptive uses of social media 
for political purposes. I am going to set aside the problem of foreign nation-
states or their representatives manipulating social media because that would 
raise the largely unresolved and complex problem of whether foreign states 
or their nationals not present within the United States enjoy First 
Amendment rights to communicate to U.S. citizens. But the problem of 
“fake news” and manipulation of social media to move political sentiment 
is hardly limited to Vladimir Putin. To the contrary, given the seeming 
effectiveness of these techniques in the 2016 election, we can fairly expect 
more to come from all sorts of sources. 
One fairly obvious starting point: If any state entity sought to directly 
regulate or ban “fake news” on social media, through for example, “take-
down” requirements similar to those imposed by the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act with regard to intellectual property,123 I would expect all or 
almost all of the nine current Justices, whether Candides, Cassandras, or in-
between, to vote to strike down such legislation. The Court has already held 
in a non-Internet case that even intentional falsehoods are entitled to some 
level of First Amendment protection, 124 and there is no reason to expect that 
principle not to be extended to the Internet. Furthermore, such a law would 
require a minimal statutory definition of political “falsehood,” an obviously 
fraught subject. Given the enormous risk of self-serving political 
manipulation or bias posed by government regulation of social media 
falsehoods on political topics, I would expect all the Justices to balk. Which 
is precisely why such blunt regulatory initiatives are unlikely to be enacted 
by any legislature with a modicum of common sense. 
A more likely scenario (and one apparently under active discussion) is 
to extend the kinds of disclosure requirements for political advertising 
currently applicable to traditional media to social media.125 The Court, it 
should be noted, has upheld disclosure requirements for traditional media 
(with only Justice Thomas dissenting).126 Would it do the same for social 
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media? On first cut, there would seem no barrier to doing so, since 
Packingham (and a previous case127) suggest that the same First 
Amendment standards apply to the Internet as to traditional media. The 
counter-argument is that “each medium of expression . . . may present its 
own problems,”128 and that disclosure requirements impose special burdens 
on Internet firms (or so such firms claim129) not present in other contexts. 
Assuming these arguments have a basis in fact (a question beyond the scope 
of this paper or current public knowledge), one could imagine a technology 
Candide striking down such requirements on the grounds that the burden on 
speech outweighs any social benefit, or alternatively on the grounds that the 
law, whatever its purpose, will have the effect of suppressing substantial 
amounts of speech rather than merely adding to the total of public 
information as disclosure requirements are intended to do. A similar 
argument, though based on legitimate concerns of retaliation, did convince 
the Court in the pre-Internet era to strike down, on an as-applied basis, a 
facially valid disclosure requirement.130 Given these countervailing 
arguments, each Justice’s ultimate inclination will likely turn on his or her 
attitude towards new technology and the need to foster it, versus the need to 
rein it in or not give it special privileges—i.e., whether the Justice is a 
Candide or a Cassandra. And on those issues much uncertainty remains, 
especially regarding Justices Breyer and Gorsuch.131 
A last, extremely difficult question, which I will raise but not attempt to 
answer fully here, is whether the Roberts Court as currently constituted 
would permit a state actor (most likely Congress or a federal regulatory 
entity) to impose structural restrictions, akin to net neutrality, on Internet 
content providers such as Facebook or (more likely) Google and other 
search engines. In other words, would the Court interpret the First 
Amendment to permit legislative or regulatory action that moves content-
providers more towards a common carrier model, and away from the current 
model in which firms are presumed to maintain essentially unlimited control 
over the content available on their platforms. Faced with a similar question 
with respect to print newspapers, the Court rejected legislative 
interference,132 but when earlier faced with restrictions on the broadcast 
media, it acquiesced.133 As noted above, over the years the Court (including 
notably the Roberts Court in Packingham) has been inclined to treat the 
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Internet as more akin to print media, entitled to full First Amendment 
protection, rather than to broadcast, the unloved stepchild of the First 
Amendment.134 For that reason among others, one suspects that the 
Candides will disfavor even structural regulation. But it should be noted that 
in light of the almost complete market dominance of some Internet firms 
such as Facebook and Google, perhaps the broadcast analogy is somewhat 
apt (certainly European regulators appear to increasingly believe so135). 
Cassandras and technology wafflers on the Court may well be tempted by 
such reasoning, so long as any structural regulation is politically unbiased 
and content-neutral. On the other hand, reducing platform-owners’ control 
over the content they display could easily increase the incidence of “fake 
news” and harmful speech such as revenge porn by disabling those firms 
from screening out such content. For that reason, on the whole, I doubt that 
the current Court would move in the direction of lessening First Amendment 
protections for Internet firms given the limited benefits of such a move and 
the increased disorder and risk it would undoubtedly entail; but the jury 
remains out. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the apparent attitudes of the current Justices of 
the Roberts Court towards technology and free speech, as reflected 
primarily in the positions those Justices (except for Justice Gorsuch) took 
in the four major Roberts Court free speech decisions which touch on 
technology. It then sought to apply the insights gained therein to several 
likely or possible regulatory initiatives which, if enacted over the next 
several years as seems quite possible, would surely draw constitutional fire. 
The results were admittedly tentative and contained a large margin of 
uncertainty. But the exercise was still, I would argue, productive. Most 
importantly, what this paper hopefully demonstrates is that any effort to 
study the Justices through a lens other than the usual partisan one is 
valuable, given the tendency in our partisan times to subsume all other 
distinctions and nuances into politics. And technology is surely not the only 
or even most important question that divides the Justices in ways that do not 
correlate perfectly, or even well, with political partisanship. What this 
article demonstrates, hopefully, is that identifying and studying such 
distinctions can be useful, instructive, and at the least diverting.
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